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INTRODUCTION
It is often assumed, following the traditional, “commonsense” view, that words have ﬁxed, literal meanings,which can be deﬁned independently of the context of
use. Judges tend to make similar assumptions. Although
they aim to give effect to the intention of the legislature,
the contractor or the testator, they have good reasons to
avoid pragmatic interpretation, which may lead to case-by-
case interpretation in which they would no longer be
following a rule at all. They claim instead to collect the
intention from the words used. Unfortunately, this cannot
be possible. It is a basic principle of linguistic pragmatics
that, since the context always affects understanding, the
communicative intention cannot be identical with the
purely semantic sense of the words.
On closer inspection the idea of a “true and correct”
literal meaning turns out to be a layman’s illusion, which
does not even account for the natural use of substantive
terms, which do not simply denote substances. Even
reference to individuals, using proper names and deﬁnite
descriptions, must depend to some extent on the speaker’s
intention in context.
Reference to individuals
If the function of names or deﬁnite descriptions was
simply to denote the relevant individuals, then
expressions which fail to refer, that is, those to which no
referent corresponds, would have no meaning. Yet it
seems obvious that, if “Excalibur” is the name of an
object, it should not cease to have meaning when the
object is broken into pieces (Wittgenstein 1953, para
40). If the meaning of referential expressions depended
on the existence of the relevant individual, it would not
be possible to refer to imaginary, non existent or ﬁctional
characters. Common expressions like “Harry Potter” or
“the baby we never had” would have to be classed as
meaningless. Statements claiming, uncontroversially, that
“Harry Potter does not exist” would then appear as
paradoxical (if true, they would be meaningless, and if
meaningful, they would be false). Furthermore,
statements of identity, where different names or deﬁnite
descriptions relate to the same individual, would be
simple tautologies. Thus to say that “Brett MR is Lord
Esher” or “William Murray is Lord Mansﬁeld” would be
to say no more than “Brett is Brett”, or “Murray is
Murray”. Similarly with deﬁnite descriptions, as to
enquire whether “Gordon Brown is the present PM”, or
indeed whether “Scott is the author of Waverley’ (Russell,
“On denoting”, Mind 1905), would be simply to ask
whether ‘Brown’ was Brown or ‘Scott’ was Scott. Frege’s
solution to this problem (“Sinn und Bedeutung”, 1892)
was to distinguish between the meaning and the
denotation. However, this has the unfortunate effect of
presenting the “meaning” as a private, purely mental
entity rather than as a public property which could be
grasped and communicated by different speakers.
Nor is it possible to understand proper names as
standing for an exhaustive set of descriptions, as then the
meaning would then vary according to different speakers’
knowledge or interests. This problem was clearly pointed
out by Wittgenstein (“Philosophical Investigations”, 1953):
“We may say, following Russell: the name ‘Moses’ can be
defined by means of various descriptions. For example, as ‘the
man who led the Israelites through the wilderness’, ‘the man
who lived at that time and place and was then called ‘Moses’.
[...] And according as we assume one definition or another
the proposition ‘Moses did not exist’ acquires a different sense,
and so does every other proposition about Moses.”
(Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, para 79)
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Although the question of the meaning of names has long
been a subject of philosophical debate, few genuine
problems arise in practice either in ordinary conversation
or in the interpretation of wills. Where names are misused
in wills, the problems raised are usually restricted to the
question of identiﬁcation.
Testatators are occasionally mistaken regarding the
names of the objects of their generosity. The existence of
the Latin maxim veritas demonstrationis tollit errorem nominis
leads us to suppose that such difﬁculties were not unknown
to Roman lawyers. But the problems raised usually concern
the identity of the beneﬁciary rather than the more
complex question of the meaning of his or her name.
In Re Smalley (Smalley v Scotton) (1929) 73 Sol Jo 234,
CA, the testator left a gift to “my wife Eliza Ann Smalley.”
His wife’s name was in fact Mary Ann. He had left her to
live with Eliza Ann Mercer, the widow of a publican. The
court, required to discover the intention of the testator,
and unwilling to suppose that he had intentionally made a
meaningless will, admitted evidence to show that during
the latter part of his life, the testator did habitually use the
word “wife” as implying Eliza Ann Mercer. Hanworth MR
held that the name was less important than the deﬁnite
description: “The word ‘Smalley’ added to the words ‘Eliza
Ann’ meant nothing at all, because it was simply linked
with the word ‘wife’.”
In NSPCC v SNSPCC [1915] AC 207, it was claimed that
a Scottish testator who had left £500 to the National
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children really
meant to leave the money to the equivalent Scottish society.
Again, the problem was one of identiﬁcation rather than
meaning. The Scottish court thought the money should
remain in Scotland, but the House of Lords decided
unanimously that, as the two societies had the same aims,
it was unnecessary to create such an unfortunate
precedent. The gift therefore went to the London society,
the unspoken assumption being that, as the two Societies
had similar aims, the testator was unlikely to object.
The presupposition of existence
For Russell (1905), the successful use of names must
depend on the existence of the individual referred to.
Deﬁnite descriptions are also said to presuppose the
existence of the referent. Where the presupposition fails,
as in “The present King of France”, the expression cannot
be said to be either true or false. It must therefore be
meaningless. The view now appears as an
oversimpliﬁcation.
On the linguistic level, Strawson showed (“On
Referring”, 1950) that a sentence like “Among the people
I met yesterday was the present King of France” could be
seen as false, rather than meaningless. More generally, this
seems to be the case where the deﬁnite description ﬁgures
in the predicate rather than as the subject of the sentence.
Strawson’s solution was to propose a more pragmatic
deﬁnition of presupposition. On the new view, speakers,
and not linguistic expressions are said to refer. Thus
reference “is something that someone can use an
expression to do.” This means that interpretation must
depend on the communicative intention in context. Thus,
contrary to judicial assumption, there can be no purely
literal understanding.
To consider deﬁnite descriptions which fail to refer as
systematically meaningless rather than false would also risk
creating new legal problems. Misrepresentation would be
hard to prove if a reference to a “Stradivarius violin of
1738”, for example, was considered as referring to nothing
at all, the maker having died the previous year. (It may also
be difﬁcult to secure a conviction for “breach of the
peace”, if the non existence of the “peace” was accepted as
a defence.) Deﬁnite descriptions are often mistakenly used
in wills; problems arise where the description fails to refer
to the intended individual.
In Wagstaff [1908] 1 Ch 162, for example, a testator left
the use of his house to: “My dear wife, D J Wagstaff ; if she
shall so long continue my widow, for her own use and
beneﬁt, and upon her decease or second marriage, then
over.” However, although he had gone through a
marriage ceremony with her in 1884, the lady in question
was never truly his wife, and could not therefore be his
widow. She was in fact already married to one A G Jalland,
who was still living. The deﬁnite description therefore had
no referent, and should be considered meaningless.
Kekewich J considered this possibility, but preferred to rely
on what he called a “secondary” meaning:
“I must find some way out of it. I am not at liberty to say
that he meant nothing. If he does use the word ‘widow’ in a
secondary sense, my duty is to find out what is the secondary
sense.” (Re Wagstaff ChD 1905, per Kekewich J)
Kekewich J’s judgment was conﬁrmed on appeal by
Cozens-Hardy MR, who gave more importance to the
name than to the (false) description:
“The testator first of all gives certain furniture and effects to
‘my dear wife, Dorothy Josephine Wagstaff, for her own
absolute use and benefit.’ Now there is not a moment’s doubt
as to who is meant by that. The testator means beyond all
doubt, and it has not been disputed, the lady with whom he
went through the form of marriage at St. George’s, Hanover
Square.” (CA, Cozens-Hardy MR)
THE CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCE
The fact that referential expressions usually function
unproblematically suggests that a theory which predicts
unavoidable metaphysical difﬁculties is probably
inadequate. Kripke (“Naming and necessity,” 1972)
proposes a more realistic theory, in which the use of
proper names is seen as a kind of linguistic practice (in the
sense of Wittgenstein, 1953), depending ultimately on a
kind of original baptism. In this theory, reference depends 17
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neither on facts in the real world, nor on individual
perceptions, but rather on shared beliefs in the linguistic
community. Names are associated with characteristics
which are neither necessary, nor analytic. The name will
therefore continue to function even where particular
beliefs are abandoned.
According to the causal theory, names continue to refer
to the relevant individual, even where no information is
available apart from the name itself. Aldous Huxley pointed
out the circularity involved in this approach, with the
somewhat paradoxical aphorism: “The author of the Iliad is
either Homer or, if not Homer, somebody else of the same
name.” Yet in spite of the apparently fragile basis, the
theory still seems intuitively satisfactory. Everyone
understands references to the Biblical character of Jonah,
for example, even though nothing supposedly known about
him is in fact true. A more contemporary case is observed
in one of the “Dud and Pete” dialogues, in which they
discuss the situation of one “Roger Braintree”, unknown to
either of them. Their conversation was based on a name
found in the telephone directory.
The causal theory thus shows how proper names can
unproblematically denote particular individuals even in
conditions of imperfect knowledge. However, it is a
consequence of the theory that deﬁnite descriptions do not
function in the same way. Instead, they take their sense
from the description given.
Rigid reference and ambiguity
Kripke’s causal theory predicts that while proper names
refer rigidly to the same individual in all possible worlds,
deﬁnite descriptions will appear ambiguous in modal
contexts.
This distinction may be illustrated as follows. Although
“Gordon Brown” and “the present Prime Minister” refer
to the same individual, the sentences “Gordon Brown
could have been English” and “the present PM could have
been English” are not synonymous. The former evokes a
possible world in which the same individual was born
south of the border. But the latter has (at least) a second
possible reading. While it may evoke the same possible
world in which Gordon Brown was born south of the
border, it may also evokes another possible world in which
a different individual, an Englishman, could have been
elected to the post of Prime Minister. The same is true for
sentences like: “The PM could have been a Conservative”
(though this last example would have been more plausible
with ‘Tony Blair’).
This distinction between proper names and deﬁnite
descriptions is an obvious exception to the substitution
principle stated by Kant, according to which, if two
expressions denote the same referent, it should be possible
to substitute one expression for the other without changing
the truth value of the sentence. Similar exceptions are seen
with the de dicto/de facto distinction, which appears with
verbs of propositional attitude. As few people are
omniscient, some may not be aware of the recent change
of Prime Minister. It is quite possible for such people to
believe that the present PM is English, without necessarily
believing the same thing of Gordon Brown. This
distinction is accounted for by philosophers like Quine in
terms of opacity (“Quantiﬁers and propositional
attitudes”, 1956). He gives the example: “Ralph believes
that someone is a spy” which has several possible
interpretations, including (i) there is at least one spy, and
(ii) someone in particular is a spy. Everyone believes (i),
but there may be disagreement over (ii).
It is sometimes tempting to attempt to apply the idea of
rigid reference to legal terms, in order to deﬁne the “true
and correct” meaning of concepts like “cruelty” in the
context of “cruel and unusual punishments.” Unfortunately,
such attempts must fail, if only because “cruelty” is an
abstract expression, rather than a substantive term, and
cannot be said to refer to anything in the external world.
THE REFERENTIAL / ATTRIBUTIVE
DISTINCTION
Donnellan showed, in “Reference and deﬁnite
description” (1965), that deﬁnite descriptions are also
ambiguous between their referential and attributive uses.
This means that they may still refer to particular individuals,
even where no individual corresponds to the given
description. His example is: “Smith’s murderer is insane.”
In referring to “Smith’s murderer,” the speaker may
have intended to refer to Jones, perhaps because Jones has
been arrested and charged. Of course, as Jones has not yet
been found guilty, he should not technically be considered
a murderer. But in ordinary conversation, those who are
similarly aware of legal developments will probably grasp
the speaker’s communicative intention, even if they do not
agree that Jones is likely to be found guilty. Indeed, as
Donnellan points out, even if we later discover that Smith
committed suicide, and that no murder has in fact been
committed, the speaker may still be understood as having
intended to refer to Jones. Thus: “using the deﬁnite
description referentially, the speaker may have said
something true even though the description correctly
applies to nothing.” This is the referential use. In this
sense: “there is a right thing to be picked out by the
audience and its being the right thing is not simply a
function of its ﬁtting the description.”
However, if the speaker has no idea who the murderer
is, then, although he uses the same expression, he will not
be understood as referring to anyone in particular. The
expression no longer denotes Jones, but applies to whoever
turns out to fulﬁl the description. This is the attributive
use.
It should be noted that the correct interpretation of the
deﬁnite description can only be discovered by pragmatic
interpretation in context. It no longer depends on the18
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literal meaning of the words. Donnellan himself points out
that the communicative intention cannot be discovered by
the application of any linguistic rule:
“It does not seem possible to say categorically of a definite
description in a particular sentence that it is a referring
expression [...]. In general, whether or not a definite
description is used referentially or attributively is a function of
the speaker’s intentions in a particular case. [...] It does not
appear plausible to account for this, either, as an ambiguity
in the sentence (neither syntactic nor semantic – perhaps
pragmatically).” (Donnellan 1966: 373)
Predictably enough, the failure of literal interpretation is
a source of difﬁculty in legal interpretation.
Referential and attributive interpretations in wills
It would no doubt be difﬁcult to draft a will allowing
someone to inherit on the basis that he was a murderer,
especially if the supposed victim had in fact committed
suicide. Nevertheless, the referential / attributive
distinction is frequently a source of ambiguity in wills.
In Re Whorwood (1887) 34 Ch D 446, a valuable silver
cup was left to Lord Sherborne: “To Lord Sherborne and
his heirs my ‘Oliver Cromwell’ cup presented to our
common ancestor, Dame Ursula Whorwood, for an
heirloom.” Lord Shelborne died, to the knowledge of the
testator, before the last codicil was added to the will. The
linguistic problem arose because the eldest son
automatically acceded to his father’s title. The court had to
decide whether the new Lord Shelborne should inherit.
Internal evidence suggested that the bequest was probably
intended attributively, that is to whoever fulﬁlled the given
description at the appropriate time. References to all the
other beneﬁciaries included the ﬁrst name. It was also
explicitly stated that the cup was intended as an heirloom.
Yet the court refused the attributive interpretation,
insisting that the bequest must have been made
referentially. The reasoning, such as it is, was given as
follows:
“At the time the will was made there was no doubt as to who
was Lord Sherborne. There was only one person entitled to
that appellation. Nobody could have had any hesitation in
saying who Lord Sherborne was. No doubt the bequest did
contain terms that shewed the testator intended that the cup
should continue in the family of Lord Sherborne as an
heirloom. But that fact does not alter the construction of the
gift, which was intended for the then Lord Sherborne.” (Re
Whorwood, per North J)
This view was conﬁrmed on appeal, the court again
preferring to ignore the probable intention of the testator
in order to preserve a supposedly literal interpretation of
his words:
“The first question is whether the Court can admit evidence as
to the intention of the testator. I am of opinion that it cannot
do so. Evidence has been rightly admitted to shew that the
testator knew at the time when he made his last codicil that
the late Lord Sherborne was dead, but I do not think that
fact has any effect at all upon the construction of this clause
in the will. [...] If properly advised he would have drawn his
will differently.” (Re Whorwood, per Cotton LJ)
This apparently perverse decision may possibly be
explained pragmatically. As the testator had already left “all his
silver and plated articles” to his “faithful friend and servant,
Charles Rixon,” it would only have raised new problems if
Lord Sherborne had been allowed to take the cup.
In Re Boddington (1888), the deﬁnite description again
failed to refer. The testator made his will on the mistaken
assumption that he was married. The marriage was later
declared void ab initio for impotency. This amounts to a
retrospective declaration that he had in fact never been
married at all. He died without altering his will, leaving a
gift of £200, and an annuity to be paid to his “said wife, so
long as she shall continue my widow and unmarried.”
Regarding the gift, Fry J assumed that the deﬁnite
description was intended referentially, and allowed the lady
in question to inherit. But regarding the annuity, the same
description was interpreted attributively, so that she could
not take. His reasoning was as follows:
“It appears to me that the annuity is given to her for a period
which can never come into existence. She never was the
testator’s widow, and therefore she can never continue his
widow for any length of time. On principle, therefore, I am
unable to see how an annuity for a non-existing period can
possibly be claimed.” (Re Boddington (1884) 25 Ch D 685
per Fry J)
This result was conﬁrmed on appeal. Although the
testator clearly intended one particular lady to beneﬁt, the
description he had given failed to refer to her. According to
Lord Selborne:
“De facto she was his wife when the will was made, so there is
no ground for imagining that he intended to do more than
describe her as at that time she would be naturally and
commonly described. But the annuity is given in terms which
express a condition that she should continue his widow, and
that the annuity should be paid only so long as she continued
such, and we cannot depart from those words.” (Re
Boddington 1884 25 CA 685, per Lord Selborne LC)
Cotton LJ, concurring, also insisted on different
interpretations of the same deﬁnite description, regarding
the gift and the annuity:
“In the case of the gift of the legacy to her qua wife there is
only a falsa demonstratio; the description of wife being
intended merely to point out the individual. That is not so
and cannot be so as regards the reference to the widowhood.
The reference to widowhood is not made merely to point out
the person, but it is to point to that which will fix the
duration, the beginning, and the ending of this annuity.”
(per Lord Cotton LJ) 19
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This was the authority followed by Farwell J when he
refused to allow a “common law” wife to inherit in Re Gale
[1941] Ch 209. Although the couple had lived as man and
wife for an extended period, they had never in fact married.
As the inheritance was not a gift but a beneﬁt “during
widowhood,” Farwell J felt obliged to interpret the
description attributively, rather than rely on the name given:
“The benefit given to her in respect of the house in Leeds is
‘the use and enjoyment thereof during her widowhood’ and
that the payment of £1. 5s. per week is ‘during her
widowhood for a period of twelve years’. It is said that neither
of those gifts can take effect because the period named in the
will is ‘during her widowhood’; and that that is a period
which has never come into existence, she never having been
married.” (Re Gale Ch D 1941, per Farwell J)
Similar problems occur with (unsurprising) frequency.
In Re Amyot [1904] AC 268 the will referred to “the eldest
son of my sister Frances McLean Gibney and his heirs for
ever.” The son in question predeceased the testator, and
the question arose as to whether the surviving son should
take. Lord MacNaghton refused, considering that there was
no reason to suppose that the testator had not intended to
use the description (referentially) to refer to an individual:
“There being then a person in existence at the time answering
the description in the will, their Lordships are of opinion that
that person, though he died afterwards in the testator’s
lifetime, was the object of the testator’s bounty. There is
nothing in the context to warrant any departure from the
proper and ordinary meaning of the words employed.” (Re
Amyot 1904, per Lord MacNaghton)
It was pointed out that the single surviving son would
not normally be referred to as “the eldest”, but this overly
grammatical approach was abandoned when it became
apparent that even the deceased ﬁrst son should more
correctly have been described as “the elder” (of two sons).
That objection was said to “savour of hypercriticism”.
In Re Hickman’s Will Trusts [1948] Ch 624 a necklace was
left “to the wife of my grandson.” At the date of death in
1914, the grandson in question was still unmarried and so
no individual answered the description. By the time of the
hearing, however, Harman J was driven to describe the
proceedings as a contest between two ladies, as the
grandson had married and divorced Lilian Williams, and
was already married again, to Dame Nancy Hickman. The
judge again assumed that the testator intended to refer to
an individual (on the dubious grounds that the necklace
cannot have been meant to be “stretched round the
collective neck of personal representatives). However, as he
could not indulge in speculation as to the intention of the
testatrix “if she had been able to foresee the future,” he
followed the principle suggested in Jarman on Wills:
“I think the principle must apply that the first person who
answers the description of being the wife of the grandson is
the one who takes the jewel and that there is nothing that
can divest her of it”. (Re Hickman per Harman J)
In these latter cases, we observe a clear judicial
preference for the referential interpretation, which appears
to be adopted by default in cases of doubt in order to
resolve any apparent ambiguity. However, the supposed
“literal” meaning will always appear ambiguous, as the
correct interpretation can only be decided in context. This
means that it will be difﬁcult to draft a will so as to impose
the attributive interpretation. William Thompson managed
nevertheless to make the attributive reading explicit. He
intended to marry before going to sea as a sub-lieutenant
in 1942, and found the time to make a will in favour of his
future wife without referring to any potential partner in
particular: “I, William Gilmour Thomson [...] do hereby in
the event of my being married bequeath everything that I
possess to my wife whoever she may be even if I leave
children to be held under this will in trust.”
He did marry, but was lost at sea only three months
later. There were no problems about identifying his widow.
However, the remaining provisions, concerning the
valuation of the stocks and shares and the effect of
remarriage, turned out to be so complex that the case was
heard three times, in 1946, in 1955, and ﬁnally in 1969.
This form of words incidentally had the effect of
imposing a future, rather than a present tense reading of
the expression “may be”, although this had been excluded
in various earlier cases, regarding “any children who may
be born” in wills, or indeed “houses which may be built”
or “balance which may be due” in business agreements, as
in Broom v Batchelor (1856) 1 H&N 255. In that case,
Pollock CB pointed out that the expression was frequently
used in the Bible and in Shakespeare to refer to future
events. However Bramwell B, dissenting, considered that
the expression normally refers to the present, as in
something which “may be black”, or “ﬁt to eat” or “ﬁt to
cook.” This unsuccessful argument was based on the
mistaken assumption that a literal meaning could be
established, independently of the communicative intention
in context.
CONCLUSION
When deciding cases, judges are obliged to take one
interpretation as correct, thus by implication rejecting the
others as unacceptable. Linguists, on the contrary, avoid
making such judgments, and instead aim to describe the
relations between the different possible meanings observed
in context. They do not attempt to decide questions of
grammaticality of interpretation independently of
speakers’ intuitions, but aim instead to account for these
intuitions, which constitute the data to be explained.
Whatever meaning appears in a given context is therefore
accepted as the natural meaning in that context. Linguistic
theory cannot therefore be expected to provide a
justiﬁcation for legal decisions. While there is a linguistic20
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aspect to legal adjudication, there can be no question of
replacing judges with linguists.
Legal scholars may nevertheless ﬁnd an awareness of the
main theoretical questions in linguistics useful. Even a
basic knowledge of the linguistic metalanguage may
facilitate discussion and reduce reliance on personal
intuition.
The problem raised here principally concerns the nature
of literal meaning, which is the subject of debate both in
the ﬁeld of semantics and in the law. Linguists agree that
literal meaning cannot be observable, as all language
necessarily occurs in some context. The contextualist
philosophers go further, claiming that there can be no
literal, or acontextual, meaning even at the most basic level.
This view is corroborated to some extent by the
observation that whenever literal meaning is mentioned in
legal judgments, the judge ﬁnds himself unsure what to do.
(Although this formulation may involve a certain confusion
of cause and effect, the fact of the correlation remains).
Although (English) judges often claim to be basing their
interpretation on the words used, they frequently accept
what amounts in practice to a contextualist approach to the
interpretation of wills. As purely literal interpretation
cannot even account for reference to individuals, it has
been accepted, at least since the judgment of James LJ in
Boyes v Cook (1880) 28 WR 754, that in this ﬁeld, the judge
must place himself in the testator’s armchair and consider
the surrounding circumstances in order to discover his
intention.
More generally, it is often admitted that linguistic usage
depends not on objective deﬁnition but on agreement and
shared knowledge within a particular community. In Doe v
Hiscocks (1839) 5 M&W 363, for example, Lord Abinger
suggested, albeit with some exaggeration, that within the
testator’s particular linguistic community, words may
habitually be associated with meanings unavailable to
outsiders. He therefore took all the facts and circumstances
respecting persons or property to which the will relates as
legitimate and necessary evidence for the understanding of
the will.
“Again, the testator may have habitually called certain persons
or things by peculiar names, by which they were not
commonly known. If these names should occur in his will,
they could only be explained and construed by the aid of
evidence to shew the sense in which he used them, in like
manner as if his will were written in cypher, or in a foreign
language.” (Doe v Hiscocks per Lord Abinger, cited by
Hanworth MR in Smalley [1929] 2 Ch 112).
This corresponds well with the observation that people
use language differently in different contexts, for example,
in social, professional and familial interactions. To this
extent, we are all bi- or plurilingual.
This point is accepted and apparently taken for granted
in Thorn v Dickens [1906] WN 54, regarding the
interpretation of what is still probably the shortest will ever
to be held valid. The day before his death in 1905, the
testator executed a document revoking his earlier will of
1896, containing only the three words “All for mother.”
The testator’s mother could not inherit as she had not only
predeceased the testator, but was already deceased at the
date of the will. The court held that the testator had used
the word “mother” to refer to his wife. Signiﬁcantly, no
argument or explanation is given. Instead, it is simply
stated in the headnote that: “It was ‘proved and admitted’
that ‘mother’ meant the widow.”
Contextual interpretation appears uncontroversial in
wills regarding referential expressions. It may be expected
to raise more difﬁcult problems when the judge is required
to determine the meaning of general terms in statutes,
where expressions denoting natural kinds must be
determined in contexts which may never have been
envisaged by the legislature.
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